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Artificial Intelligence and Online 
Extremism: Challenges and Opportunities  
 
Radicalisation is a process that historically used to be triggered mainly through social interactions 
in places of worship, religious schools, prisons, meeting venues, etc. Today, this process is often 
initiated on the Internet, where radicalisation content is easily shared, and potential candidates are 
reached more easily, rapidly, and at an unprecedented scale (Edwards and Gribbon, 2013; Von 
Behr et al., 2013). 
In recent years, some terrorist organisations succeeded in leveraging the power of social media to 
recruit individuals to their cause and ideology (Farwell, 2014). It is often the case that such 
recruitment attempts are initiated on open social media platforms (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, 
YouTube) but then move onto private messages and/or encrypted platforms (e.g., WhatsApp, 
Telegram). Such encrypted communication channels have also been used by terrorist cells and 
networks to plan their operations (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr). 
To counteract the activities of such organisations, and to halt the spread of radicalisation content, 
some governments, social media platforms, and counter-extremism agencies are investing in the 
creation of advanced information technologies to identify and counter extremism through the 
development of Artificial Intelligent (AI) solutions (Correa and Sureka, 2013; Agarwal and Sureka 
2015a; Scrivens and Davies, 2018). 
These solutions have three main objectives: (i) understanding the phenomena behind online 
extremism (the communication flow, the use of propaganda, the different stages of the 
radicalisation process, the variety of radicalisation channels, etc.), (ii) automatically detecting 
radical users and content, and (iii) predicting the adoption and spreading of extremist ideas. 
Despite current advancements in the area, multiple challenges still exist, including: (i) the lack of 
a common definition of prohibited radical and extremist internet activity, (ii) the lack of solid 
verification of the datasets collected to develop detection and prediction models, (iii) the lack of 
cooperation across research fields, since most of the developed technological solutions are 
neither based on, nor do they take advantage of, existing social theories and studies of 
radicalisation, (iv) the constant evolution of behaviours associated with online extremism in 
order to avoid being detected by the developed algorithms (changes in terminology, creation of 
new accounts, etc.) and, (v) the development of ethical guidelines and legislation to regulate the 
design and development of AI technology to counter radicalisation. 
In this book chapter we provide an overview of the current technological advancements towards 
addressing the problem of online extremism (with a particular focus on Jihadism). We identify 
  
some of the limitations of current technologies, and highlight some of the potential opportunities. 
Our aim is to reflect on the current state of the art and to stimulate discussions on the future design 
and development of AI technology to target the problem of online extremism. 
An overview of existing approaches  
A wide range of work has emerged in the last few years that applied and developed AI technologies 
with the aim of examining the radicalisation phenomenon, and understanding the social media 
presence and actions of extremist organisations (Correa and Sureka, 2013; Agarwal and Sureka 
2015a; Scrivens and Davies, 2018).  
 
Figure 1: Overview of AI approaches to counter online radicalisation 
Broadly, these works can be categorised as (see Figure 1): (i) those that focus on the intelligent, 
large-scale analysis of online radicalisation to better understand this phenomenon, (ii) those that 
focus on the automatic detection of radicalisation, including the detection of radical content 
online, as well as the detection of radical user accounts, and (iii) those that focus on the automatic 
prediction of radicalisation (adoption of extremist content, interaction with extremist accounts, 
etc.). Note that, while we do not present an exhaustive list of works in this chapter, the following 
sections aim at providing an overview of some representative approaches, including their main 
  
objective, the data they used to support their research, the key algorithms used, and the main output 
of their work.  
Analysis 
Works that have focused on the application of AI technologies for the intelligent, large-scale 
analysis of radicalisation (see Table 1) have different objectives. Among these objectives we can 
highlight: (i) studying the communication flow within the online medium (Klausen, 2015), (ii) 
analysing influence (Carter et al., 2014), (iii) investigating how propaganda is presented and 
spread online (Chatfield et al., 2015; Badawy and Ferrara, 2018), (iv) observe the evolution of 
radicalisation language (Vergani and Bliuc, 2015), (v) study the radicalisation process 
(Bermingham et al., 2009; Rowe and Saif, 2016), and (vi) the analysis of the different online 
radicalisation channels.  
Klausen (Klausen, 2015) studied the role of social media, and particularly Twitter, in the jihadists’ 
operational strategy in Syria and Iraq. During 2014, they collected information on 59 Twitter 
accounts of Western-origin fighters known to be in Syria, and their networks (followers and 
followees), leading to a total of 29,000 studied accounts. The 59 original accounts were manually 
identified by the research team. They used known network metrics, such as degree-centrality, 
number of followers or number of tweets, to identify the most influential users. The authors also 
conducted a manual analysis of the top recent posts of influential individuals to determine the key 
topics of conversation (religious instruction, reporting battle and interpersonal communication), as 
well as the content of pictures and videos. The study highlights the direction of the communication 
flow, from the terrorist accounts, to the fighters based in the insurgent zones, to the followers in 
the west, and the prominence of female members acting as propagandist.  
Carter (Carter et al., 2014), collected during 12-months information from 190 social media 
accounts of Western and European foreign fighters affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusrah and ISIS. 
These accounts were manually identified and comprise both, Facebook and Twitter accounts. The 
paper examined how foreign fighters receive information and who inspires them. The analysis 
looked at the most popular Facebook pages by “likes”, or the most popular Twitter accounts by 
“follows”, as well as the numbers of comments and shares of different posts. The paper also looked 
at the word clouds of different profiles, revealing terms like (islamic, Allah, fight, Mujahideen, 
ISIS, etc.) The paper reveals the existence of spiritual authorities who foreign fighters go to for 
inspiration and guidance. 
Chatfield (Chatfield et al., 2015) investigated how ISIS members/supporters used Twitter to 
radicalise and recruit other users. For this purpose, they study 3,039 tweets from one account of 
a known ISIS “information disseminator”. Two annotators categorised those posts manually as: 
propaganda (information), radicalisation (believes in support of intergroup conflict and violence), 
terrorist recruitment (enticing others to join in fighting the jihad war) and other. Examples of these 
tweets and their content is provided as a result of this exercise. The analysis also studied the 
  
frequency and times of posting, indicating highly active users, as well as the network of users 
mentioned in the tweets, which were manually categorised as: international media, regional Arabic 
media, IS sympathisers and IS fighters.  
Vergani (Vergani and Bliuc, 2015) investigated the evolution of the ISIS’s language by analysing 
the text contained in the first 11 issues of Dabiq; the official ISIS internet magazine in English. To 
conduct their analysis they made use of the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text 
analysis program. Their analysis highlighted: (i) the use of expressions related to achievement, 
affiliation and power, (ii) a focus on emotional language, which is considered to be effective in 
mobilising individuals, (ii) frequent mentions of death, female, and religion, which are related to 
the ISIS ideology and the recruitment of women to the cause, and (iv) the use of internet jargon 
(“btw”, “lol”, etc.), which may be more effective in establishing a communication with the 
youngest generations of potential recruits. 
While (Klausen, 2015; Carter et al., 2014; Chatfield et al., 2015) studied the social media behaviour 
of users once radicalised, Rowe and Saif (Rowe and Saif, 2016) studied the social media actions 
and interactions of Europe-based Twitter users before, during, and after they exhibited pro-ISIS 
behaviour. Starting from 512 radicalised Twitter accounts, manually identified in the work of 
O’Callagan (O’Callagan, 2014), they collected their followers, filtered those based in Europe and 
determined whether those followers were radicalised based on two hypotheses: (i) use of pro-ISIS 
terminology, a lexicon was generated to test this hypothesis, and (ii) content shared from pro-ISIS 
accounts. Their filtering process led to the study of 727 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts and their 
complete timelines. The study concluded that prior to being activated/radicalised users go 
through a period of significant increase in adopting innovations (i.e., communicating with new 
users and adopting new terms). They also highlight that social homophily has a strong bearing on 
the diffusion process of pro-ISIS terminology through Twitter. 
Bermingham and colleagues (Bermingham et al., 2009) looked at the user profiles and comments 
of a YouTube video group whose purpose was “the conversion of infidels” with the aim of 
assessing whether users were being radicalised by the group and how this was reflected in 
comments and interactions. They collected a total of 135,000 comments posted by 700 members 
and 13,000 group contributors. They performed term frequency to observe the top-terms used in 
the group as well as sentiment analysis over a subset of comments filtered by a list of keywords of 
interest (Islam, Israel, Palestine, etc.). They also used centrality measures to identify influencers. 
They observed that the group was mostly devoted to religious discussion (not radicalisation) and 
that female users show more extreme and less tolerant views. 
Badawy and Ferrara, (Badawy and Ferrara, 2018), explored the use of social media by ISIS to 
spread its propaganda and to recruit militants. To do so, they analysed a dataset of 1.9 million 
tweets posted by 25K ISIS and ISIS-sympathizers accounts. They distinguish three different types 
of messages (violence-driven, theological and sectarian content) and they traced a connection 
between online rhetoric and events happening in the real world. 
  
In 2017, Lara-Cabrera and colleagues (Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017) translated a set of indicators 
found in social science theories of radicalisation (feelings of frustration, introversion, perception 
of discrimination, etc.) into a set of computational features (mostly sets of keywords) that they 
could automatically extract from the data. They assessed the appearance of these indicators in: (i) 
a set of 17K tweets from pro-ISIS users provided by Kaggle (Kaggle, 2019), a set of 76K tweets 
from pro-ISIS users provided by Anonymous1 and a set of 173K tweets randomly selected by 
opening the Twitter stream. The authors concluded that, while the proposed metrics showed 
promising results, these metrics were mainly based on keywords. More refined metrics can 
therefore be proposed to map social science indicators. 
Table1: Approaches that focus on the analysis of online radicalisation 
Work Goal Data AI algorithm / 
technique 
Conclusions 
  
(Klausen, 
2015)  
Study the 
communication flow 
in the jihadists’ 
operational strategy in 
Syria and Iraq 
59 pro-ISIS 
Twitter accounts 
(manually 
assessed) and 
their networks 
(29,000 
accounts) 
Social network 
analysis  in 
combination with 
manual analysis of 
accounts, tweets 
and images 
Communication flow, 
from the terrorist 
accounts, to the fighters 
based in the insurgent 
zones, to the followers in 
the west. Prominence of 
female members acting as 
propagandist 
  
(Carter et al., 
2014)  
Examine how foreign 
fighters receive 
information and who 
inspires them 
(influence) 
190 pro-ISIS 
Twitter and 
Facebook 
accounts 
(manually 
assessed) 
Manual annotation 
and assessment of 
accounts in 
combination with 
social network 
analysis 
Existence of spiritual 
authorities who foreign 
fighters look to for 
inspiration and guidance 
  
(Chatfield et 
al., 2015)  
Investigate how ISIS 
members/supporters 
used Twitter to 
radicalise and recruit 
other users 
3,039 tweets 
from one account 
of a known ISIS 
"information 
disseminator" 
(Twitter) 
Social network 
analysis combined 
with manual 
analysis of content 
Posts about propaganda, 
radicalisation and terrorist 
recruitment mentioning 
international media, 
regional Arabic media, IS 
sympathisers and IS 
fighters. 
  
(Vergani and 
Bliuc, 2015)  
Investigated the 
evolution of the ISIS’s 
language 
first 11 issues of 
Dabiq, the 
official ISIS’s 
internet 
magazine 
Natural Language 
Processing based 
on LIWC 
(Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count) 
Use expressions related 
to achievement, 
affiliation and power. 
Emotional language. 
Mentions of death female 
and religion and use of 
internet jargon 
 
1 https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/13/anonymous-hackers-islamic-state-isis-chan-online-war/ 
  
  
(Rowe and 
Saif, 2016)  
Study Europe-based 
Twitter users before, 
during, and after they 
exhibited pro-ISIS 
behaviour to better 
understand the 
radicalisation process 
727 pro-ISIS 
Twitter 
accounts. 
Categorised as 
pro-ISIS base on 
the use of 
radicalised 
terminology and 
sharing from 
radicalised 
accounts 
Modelling and 
analysis of diffusion 
over time-series 
data 
Prior to being 
activated/radicalised users 
go through a period of 
significant increase in 
adopting innovations 
(i.e. communicating with 
new users and adopting 
new terms). Social 
homophily has a strong 
bearing on the diffusion 
process of pro-ISIS 
terminology. 
  
(Bermingham 
et al., 2009) 
Explore the use of 
sentiment and network 
analysis to determine 
whether a YouTube 
group was used as 
radicalisation channel 
135,000 
comments and 
13,700 user 
profiles. 
YouTube group 
manually 
assessed 
Social network 
analysis and 
content analysis 
(including the 
automatic 
extraction of topics 
and sentiment) 
The group was mostly 
devoted to religious 
discussion (not 
radicalisation). Female 
users show more extreme 
and less tolerant views 
(Badawy and 
Ferrara, 
2018) 
Explored the use of 
social media by ISIS to 
spread its propaganda 
and recruit militants 
1.9 million 
Twitter posts by 
25K ISIS and 
ISIS-
sympathizers 
accounts 
Lexicon-based 
approach to 
classify each tweet 
into violence, 
theological, 
sectarian and 
others, and an over-
time analysis of 
tweets and 
correlation with 
real-events 
Violence-driven, 
theological and 
sectarian content play a 
crucial role in ISIS 
messaging. There is a 
connection between 
online rhetoric and events 
happening in the real 
world 
  
(Lara-
Cabrera et 
al., 2017)  
Translate a set of 
indicators found in 
social science models 
into a set of 
computational features 
to identify the 
characteristics of 
users at risk of 
radicalisation 
17K Twitter 
posts from pro-
ISIS users 
provided by 
Kaggle (Kaggle, 
2019). 76K 
tweets from pro-
ISIS users 
provided by 
Anonymous. 
173K tweets 
randomly 
selected 
Five indicators are 
modelled based on 
lexicons 
(frustration, 
negative content, 
perception of 
discrimination, 
negative ideas of 
Western society and 
positive ideas about 
Jihadisim) and their 
density distribution 
is observed within 
the data 
The proposed indicators 
do indeed characterise 
radicalised users. 
Authors define as the next 
step the use of these 
indicators as features to 
create Machine Learning 
classifiers for the 
automatic classification of 
users at risk of 
radicalisation 
 
Detection 
While in the previous section we discuss examples of works which have attempted to analyse the 
phenomenon of online extremism, with the aim of understanding the different actors involved, and 
how the process kickstarts and evolves, in this section we focused on those works who have 
  
attempted to provide technological solutions to automatically detect the presence of radical 
content and users online (see Table 2).  
Works focused on content have attempted to identify radical material (either text, images or 
videos), while works focused on users have attempted to automatically identify those social media 
accounts exhibiting radicalisation signs (using radical rhetoric, sharing radical material, etc.). It is 
important to highlight here that the automatic detection and categorisation of users as radical or 
extremist is a particularly difficult and sensitive problem, since the wrong categorisation of a user 
as radical (false positive error) may result in an innocent person being subjected to surveillance or 
policing investigation. In this section we give an overview of some of these works, focusing on 
their key objectives, the AI methods applied or proposed, the datasets used to conduct the research, 
and the key obtained outputs.  
In 2013, Berger and Strathearn (Berger and Strathearn, 2013) developed an approach to detect 
individuals more prone to extremism (white supremacy in this case) among those with an 
interest in violent ideologies. Their approach started by collecting the social networks of twelve 
known extremists on Twitter (3,542 accounts were collected using this process and a maximum of 
200 tweets per account was analysed). Using the 3,542 accounts collected using this method, the 
work measured three dimensions for each user: (i) their influence (number of times their content 
was retweeted), (ii) exposure (number of times they retweeted other’s content) and (iii) 
interactivity (by looking for keywords in tweets like DM -Direct Message- or email). They 
concluded that high scores of influence and exposure showed a strong correlation to engagement 
with the extremist ideology. Manual analysis of the top 200 accounts was used for evaluating the 
proposed scoring. 
In 2015, Berger and Morgan (Berger and Morgan, 2015) aimed at creating a demographic 
snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter and outline a methodology for detecting pro-ISIS 
accounts. Starting from a set of 454 seed accounts (identified by previous research (Berger and 
Strathearn, 2013) and recursively obtaining followers of those accounts and filtering them based 
on availability of the account, robot identification, etc., they obtained a final list of 20,000 pro-
ISIS accounts to analyse. They estimated that at least 46,000 pro-ISIS accounts were active (as 
Dec 2014). They created classifiers from a subset of 6,000 accounts that were manually annotated 
as ISIS supporters or non-supporters. The authors concluded that pro-ISIS supporters could be 
identified from their profile descriptions: with terms such as succession, linger, Islamic State, 
Caliphate State or In Iraq all being prominent. When testing this classifier with 1,574 manually 
annotated accounts they obtained 94% of classification accuracy. However, profile information 
was only available for around 70% of accounts. 
Saif (Saif, 2017) proposed a semantic graph-based approach to identify pro vs. anti-ISIS social 
media accounts. By using this graph, the authors aimed at capturing the relations between terms 
(e.g., countries attacking ISIS vs. countries attacked by ISIS) as well as contextual information 
based on the co-occurrence of terms. Their work hypothesised that, by exploiting the latent 
semantics of words expressed in social media content, they could identify additional pro-ISIS and 
  
anti-ISIS signals that could complement the ones extracted from previous approaches. The authors 
developed multiple classifiers and showed that their proposed classifier, trained for semantic 
features, outperformed those trained from lexical, sentiment, topic and network features. 
Evaluation was done on a dataset of 1,132 Twitter users (with their timelines). 566 pro-ISIS 
accounts, obtained from (Rowe and Saif, 2016) and 566 anti-ISIS users, whose stance was 
determined by the use of anti-ISIS rhetoric. 
Fernandez (Fernandez and Alani, 2018) hypothesise that a key reason behind the inaccuracy of 
radicalisation detection approaches is their reliance on the appearance of terminologies and 
expressions regardless of their context. The authors therefore explore: (i) how pro-ISIS users and 
non pro-ISIS users (journalists, researchers, religious users, etc.) use the same words and 
expressions, (ii) if there exist any divergence in how the same words are used, and (iii) if this 
context divergence can be helpful to create more accurate radicalisation detection methods. 
The work uses 17K tweets from pro-ISIS users and 122K tweets from 'general' Twitter users 
available via the Kaggle datasets (Kaggle, 2019). This work concludes that the identification of 
language divergence between these groups can lead to more accurate user and content detection 
mechanisms. 
Stepping aside from the categorisation of users as ‘radical’ or ‘non-radical’, Fernandez (Fernandez 
et al., 2018) proposed an approach to measure the influence of online radicalisation that a user 
is exposed to. The proposed approach renders the social science theory of ‘roots of radicalisation’ 
(Schmid, 2013; Borum, 2016) into a computational model that computes the micro (individual, 
i.e., originating from the user himself), meso (social, i.e., originating from the user’s social 
network) and macro (global, i.e., originating from events happening in the world) radicalisation 
influence a user is exposed to based on her social media contributions. The work used 17K tweets 
from pro-ISIS users and 122K tweets from 'general' Twitter users available via the Kaggle data 
science community (Kaggle, 2019), and concluded that there is an important need to leverage more 
strongly the knowledge of theoretical models of radicalisation to design more effective 
technological solutions for the tracking of online radicalisation. 
Agarwal and Sureka (Agarwal and Sureka 2015b) investigated techniques to automatically identify 
hate and extremism promoting tweets. Starting from 2 crawls of Twitter data they used a semi-
supervised learning approach based on a list of hashtags (#Terrorism, #Islamophobia, #Extremist) 
to filter those tweets related to hate and extremism. The training dataset contained 10,486 tweets. 
They used random sampling to generate the validation dataset (1M tweets). Tweets were in English 
and manually annotated by four students. They created and validated two different classifiers 
(KNN and SVM) based on the generated datasets to classify a tweet as hate promoting or unknown. 
By creating and validating these classifiers, they concluded that the presence of religious, war 
related terms, offensive words and negative emotions are strong indicators of a tweet to be hate 
promoting. 
Ashcroft (Ashcroft et al., 2015) investigated the automatic detection of messages released by 
jihadist groups on Twitter. They collected tweets from 6729 Jihadist sympathisers. Two 
  
additional datasets, one of 2,000 randomly selected tweets, and one of tweets from accounts 
manually annotated as anti-ISIS, were collected for validation. Numbers of tweets for the pro and 
anti-ISIS datasets were not reported, but based on the provided experiments we estimated they 
should be around 2,000 each. SVM, Naive Bayes and Adaboost classifiers were trained with this 
data using stylometric, time and sentiment features. Authors concluded that Fridays are a key date 
to spread radical tweets and that automatic detection is viable but can never replace human 
analysts. It should be seen as a complementary way to detect radical content. 
Table 2: Approaches that focus on the detection of online radicalisation 
Work Goal Data AI Algorithm / 
Technique 
Conclusions 
  
(Berger and 
Strathearn, 
2013)  
Identify individuals 
prone to extremism 
from the followers of 
extremist accounts 
(user detection) 
3,542 Twitter accounts 
(followers of 12 known 
pro-ISIS accounts) 
Designed a scoring 
system to measure 
“influence” and 
“Exposure” based 
on interactions such 
as replies, retweets, 
or direct messages 
High scores of 
influence an exposure 
showed a strong 
correlation to 
engagement with the 
extremist ideology 
(manual evaluation) 
  
(Berger and 
Morgan, 
2015)  
Create a 
demographic 
snapshot of ISIS 
supporters on Twitter 
and outline a 
methodology for 
detecting pro-ISIS 
accounts (user 
detection) 
20,000 pro-ISIS 
Twitter accounts 
(7,574 manually 
annotated to test 
classification) 
A Machine 
Learning (ML) 
classifier was 
trained based on 
6,000 accounts and 
tested with 1574. 
No details are 
provided on the ML 
method used. 
The authors concluded 
that pro-ISIS supporters 
could be identified from 
their profiles 
descriptions: with 
terms such as 
succession, linger, 
Islamic State, Caliphate 
State or In Iraq all being 
prominent 
  
(Saif, 2017)  
Create classifiers 
able to automatically 
identify pro-ISIS 
users in social media 
(user detection) 
1,132 Twitter users 
(566 pro-ISIS, 556 
anti-ISIS). Annotation 
based on the 
terminology used and 
the sharing from 
known radicalised 
accounts 
SVM classifiers are 
created based on n-
grams, sentiment, 
topic and network 
features. The 
authors also 
proposed classifier 
based on semantic 
features (frequent 
patterns extracted 
from a knowledge-
graph).  
Classifiers trained on 
semantic features 
outperform those 
trained from lexical, 
sentiment, topic and 
network features 
(Fernandez 
and Alani, 
2018) 
Explore the use of 
semantic context to 
create more accurate 
radicalisation 
detection methods 
(user detection) 
17K tweets from pro-
ISIS users and 122K 
tweets from 'general' 
Twitter users available 
via the Kaggle data 
science community 
(Kaggle, 2019) 
Semantic extraction 
of entities, entity 
types, topics and 
categories from a 
knowledge graph 
(to model context) 
and incorporation of 
such context as 
features into SVM, 
Naive Bayes and 
Decision Tree 
classifiers. 
Semantic information 
can help to better 
understand the 
contextual variances in 
which radicalisation 
terms are used when 
conveying ’radicalised 
meaning’ vs. when not. 
Understanding such 
variances can help to 
create more accurate 
  
radicalisation detection 
methods. 
(Fernandez 
et al., 2018) 
Measure the 
influence of online 
radicalisation that a 
user is exposed to. 
Design a 
computational 
method based on the 
social science theory 
of roots of 
radicalisation 
(Schmid, 2013; 
Borum, 2016) (user 
detection) 
17K tweets from pro-
ISIS users and 122K 
tweets from 'general' 
Twitter users available 
via the Kaggle data 
science community 
(Kaggle, 2019) 
Use word vectors 
to model the micro 
(individual), meso 
(social) and macro 
(global) 
radicalisation 
influence. Cosine 
similarity is used to 
compare such 
vectors against a 
Lexicon of radical 
terms 
There is an important 
need to leverage closer 
the knowledge of 
theoretical models of 
radicalisation to design 
more effective 
technological solutions 
to track online 
radicalisation. 
 
  
(Agarwal 
and Sureka 
2015b) 
Automatic 
identification of hate 
and extremism 
promoting tweets 
(content detection) 
10,486 hate and 
terrorism-related 
Twitter posts 
(extracted based on 
hashtags) + 1M 
random tweets 
annotated by students 
for validation 
They tested KNN 
and LibSVM 
classifiers based on  
religious, offensive, 
slang, negative 
emotions, 
punctuations and 
war related terms 
Presence of religious, 
war related terms, 
offensive words and 
negative emotions are 
strong indicators of a 
tweet to be hate 
promoting 
  
(Ashcroft et 
al., 2015)  
Automatically detect 
messages released by 
jihadist groups on 
Twitter (content 
detection) 
2,000 pro-ISIS Twitter 
posts (containing pro-
ISIS terminology and 
extracted from the 
accounts 6,729 ISIS 
sympathisers), 2,000 
anti-ISIS 
tweets(extracted from 
manually assessed anti-
ISIS accounts), 2000 
random tweets.2  
Trained classifiers 
(SVM, Naive Bayes 
and Adaboost) 
based on 
stylometric (n-
grams, hashtags, 
word frequency, 
etc.), time-based 
and sentiment 
features 
Fridays are a key date to 
spread radical tweets. 
Automatic detection is 
viable but can never 
replace human 
analysts. It should be 
seen as a 
complementary way to 
detect radical content 
 
Prediction 
Regarding prediction of radicalisation (see Table 3), we can highlight the works of (Magdy et al., 
2016) and (Ferrara et al., 2016). 
Magdy (Magdy et al., 2016) proposed an approach to identify Arab Twitter accounts explicitly 
expressing positions supporting or opposing ISIS. They collected 57,000 Twitter users who 
authored or shared tweets mentioning ISIS and determined their stance based on the use of the full 
name of the group vs. an abbreviated form. They then created classifiers to predict future support 
 
2 Numbers of pro and anti-ISIS tweets are not reported but estimated based on the experiments 
  
of opposition to ISIS based on the users' timelines before naming ISIS. The authors conclude that 
Pro- and anti-ISIS users can be identified before they voice explicit support or opposition.  
Ferrara (Ferrara et al., 2016) proposed a computational framework for detection and prediction of 
extremism in social media. For this purpose, they used a dataset of over 3M tweets generated by 
over 25 thousand extremist accounts, who have been manually identified, reported, and suspended 
by Twitter (Ferrara, 2017), and a dataset of 29M posts from the followers of these users. Random 
forest and logistic regression were used for classification and prediction based on user metadata 
and activity features, time features, and features based on network statistics. Two types of 
predictions were made: (i) whether the follower will adopt extremist content (retweet from a 
known pro-ISIS account) and (ii) whether the follower will interact (reply) with a known pro-ISIS 
account. The authors concluded that the ratio of retweets to tweets, the average number of hashtags 
adopted, the sheer number of tweets and the average number of retweets generated by each user, 
systematically rank very high in terms of predictive power. 
Table 3: Approaches that focus on the prediction of online radicalisation 
Work Goal Data 
AI Algorithm / 
Technique Conclusions 
(Magdy 
et al., 
2016) 
Proposed an 
approach to predict 
future support or 
opposition to ISIS 
57,000 Twitter users 
who authored or 
shared tweets 
mentioning ISIS. 
Categorised as pro or 
anti-ISIS based on 
the use of the full 
name of the group vs. 
an abbreviated form 
SVM classifier based 
on bag-of-words 
features, including 
individual terms, 
hashtags, and user 
mentions 
Pro- and anti-ISIS users 
can be identified before 
they voice explicit 
support or opposition.  
  
(Ferrara 
et al., 
2016)  
Propose a 
computational 
framework for 
detection and 
prediction of: 
adoption of radical 
content and 
interaction with 
pro-ISIS accounts 
Over 3M Twitter 
posts generated by 
over 25 thousand 
extremist accounts 
(manually identified, 
reported, and 
suspended by 
Twitter). 29M posts 
from the followers of 
these accounts 
Random forest and 
logistic regression 
classifiers are used for 
classification and 
prediction based on 
user metadata and 
activity features, time 
features, and features 
based on network 
statistics 
The ratio of retweets to 
tweets, the average 
number of hashtags 
adopted, the sheer 
number of tweets and the 
average number of 
retweets generated by 
each user, systematically 
rank very high in terms 
of predictive power 
 
Challenges  
Despite the previous advancements in the area, multiple challenges still exist when targeting online 
radicalisation. These challenges include: (i) the ones that are derived from conducting research 
  
with Big Data3 such as (Volume -large amounts of content-, Velocity -new content quickly 
produced-, Variety- heterogeneity of the data and the information sources where data is produced- 
and Veracity -quality of the information-), (ii) the ones that are derived from the application of 
technology into a new field (such as technology adoption by users), and (iii) the ones that are 
specific to online radicalisation research and the development of AI applications to counter 
radicalisation. Although we acknowledge the challenges derived from the use of big data, and the 
challenges for relevant stakeholders to adopt novel counter radicalisation technology, in this book 
chapter we aim to focus on the specific challenges of the design and development of AI solutions 
to counter radicalisation. We have identified six main challenges in this work (see Figure 2). These 
challenges are described in the following subsections. 
 
Figure 2: Main challenges of the development of AI applications to counter radicalisation 
Defining Radicalisation 
One of the key challenges of the design and development of AI technology to target radicalisation 
is the lack of a common definition of prohibited radical and extremist internet activity, which 
can impede optimal enforcement (Housen-Couriel et al., 2019). Online radicalisation is a global 
phenomenon, but it is perceived differently in different regions of the world, and hence it is 
complicated to have a single unique and globally accepted definition (Meserole and Byman, 2019).  
Currently, many governments around the world are pressurising globally operating Tech 
companies, such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter, to remove and block radical content and 
 
3 http://researchhubs.com/post/ai/introduction-to-data-science/big-data-4-v.html 
 
  
accounts.4 However, no clear definitions of what constitutes a radical piece of content, or a radical 
account are provided with these government regulations, which means that Tech companies have 
to set up their own definitions and to decide which content they block or which content they keep 
online, with the corresponding ethical implications that this entails (Saltman, 2019). Initiatives 
such as the Global internet forum5, or Tech against Terrorism6 have emerged in recent years with 
the idea of formalising definitions and fostering collaborations among Tech companies, civil 
society, academics, governments and supra-national bodies such as the European Union (EU) and 
United Nations (UN). However, more dialog and collaboration across these organisations is 
needed to reach a consistent definition. 
Data collection, verification and publication 
Another very important challenge when researching online radicalisation is the availability and 
quality of data used to study this phenomena.   
As we have seen in the previous works, multiple datasets have been collected for studying 
radicalisation. However, many of these datasets are collected based on certain assumptions (e.g., 
accounts that use radical terminology or share radical material (Rowe and Saif, 2016; Magdy et 
al., 2016), accounts that follow known radical accounts (Chatfield et al., 2015), accounts that 
participate/comment in particular YouTube channels known to disseminate radical content 
(Bermingham et al., 2009)) but in many occasions, neither those assumptions, nor the data 
collected based on those assumptions, are properly verified. It is therefore unclear how the amount 
of noise (content that is not reliable or credible) that exists in those datasets is affecting the quality 
and validity of the insights gained from that data (Parekh et al., 2018). In this section we report 
on the problems derived from the current mechanisms used for data collection, verification and 
publication. 
 
4 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/soteu2018-preventing-terrorist-content-online-regulation-
640_en.pdf 
5 https://www.gifct.org/leadership/ 
6 https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/ 
  
 
Figure 3: Mechanisms used for data collection, verification and publication 
● Data collection. As reported in the previous section, common methods used for data 
collection include:  (i) data collected based on the appearance of certain terms (‘ISIS’, 
‘daesh’, etc.), (ii) data collected based on users sharing a particular URL / image or piece 
of radical material,  (iii) data collected from followers’ of known radical accounts, (iv) data 
collected from users that comment in radical channels (such as YouTube channels), and 
(v) data collected for accounts that have been blocked or suspended (using data archives 
gathered by data observatories).  
● Data verification. Once data is collected based on these assumptions, these data is either 
not verified, or partially verified, i.e., only a subset of the data is labelled by human 
annotators. These annotators are generally not experts, but students, or crowdworkers of 
crowdsourcing platforms (Agarwal and Sureka 2015b). These annotators may not have the 
religious, political or domain knowledge to assess whether a piece of content, or a 
particular user account, should be categorised as ‘radical’. The other major problem with 
data verification is the cultural perception. Gold standards have been found to vary 
depending on who is doing the annotation. In this case the same piece of content may be 
perceived as radical by experts of certain countries / cultural backgrounds, but may be 
perceived as non radical in a different cultural / socio-political context. (Patton et al., 2019, 
Olteanu et al., 2019).  
● Data publication. Due to the sensibility of the problem, the involvement of personal data, 
and existing data regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
(GDPR, 2019), datasets collected to study radicalisation are not publicly shared. Very few 
  
datasets existing online for research purposes, such as the ones exposed by the Kaggle data 
science community (Kaggle 2019). It is often the case that researchers do not share the 
data, and only provide a description of the used data and collection in their papers. 
However, once content or accounts have been blocked on social media platform, related 
data cannot be re-collected any longer. It is sometimes possible to retrieve a sample of the 
blocked content or accounts from data observatories (Ferrara, 2017), but it is unknown 
what percentage of such information is lost.  
In the following subsections we describe some of the challenges derived from the existing data 
collection, verification and publication mechanisms (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Problems with existing datasets to study radicalisation 
Noisy Data (False Positives) 
Since existing data collection mechanisms to study online radicalisation are prone to noise, and 
the collected data is not verified, or only partially verified, the generated datasets could include an 
unknown amount of false positives (i.e., content and user accounts that, while categorised as 
radical, are indeed not radical). Examples include content and accounts reporting current events, 
e.g., “Islamic State hacks Swedish radio station”, sharing harmless religious rhetoric, e.g., “If you 
want to talk to Allah, pray. If you want Allah to talk to you, read the Qur’an”, or sharing counter 
  
extremism narratives and material, e.g., “armed Jihad is for defense of Muslim nation, not for 
stablishment of the Khilafah”. Parekh and colleagues (Parekh et al., 2018) highlighted this problem 
in their analysis and stressed the fact that “nobody knows how many irrelevant accounts are present 
in past studies and therefore much of what is known from past studies of online jihadist behavior 
is highly skewed by irrelevant accounts”.  
Learning from noisy data not only means that analysis results may be imperfect, but it also means 
that the algorithms developed to detect and predict radicalisation may not perform at the reported 
levels of correctness, since they are trained based on erroneously labelled data. Since irrelevant 
accounts may erroneously be categorised as ‘radical’, based on existing data collection methods, 
it is possible that, while training from these data, the detection and prediction algorithms associate 
patterns of non-radical accounts (e.g., journalist that report about terrorist-related events, or 
religious non violent individuals) to the radical category. Note that the erroneous categorisation of 
a user as radical by a developed AI algorithm may lead to surveillance, or in the worst case, 
investigation of an innocent individual, which calls for better assessments of different types of 
errors  (Olteanu et al., 2017). Additionally, because the datasets used to train these algorithms are 
not generally public, it is not possible to verify up to which extent they contain noisy data. 
Biases 
Existing data collection mechanisms are prone to data biases (i.e., the distortion the sampled data 
that compromises its representatives) (Olteanu et al., 2019). Collected samples may therefore not 
be representative of the larger population of interest. Common biases across online radicalisation 
research include: the terminology bias, the time-period bias, the graph-sampling bias and the 
geographical location bias. However, it is relevant to note that demographic (age / gender / etc.), 
as well as behavioural biases (e.g., the various ways in which users connect and interact with one 
another), may also exist within the collected datasets.  
● Terminology: When data is collected based on restricted lexicons (i.e., selected terms and 
expressions), these lexicons may cover only a fraction of the topics or entities (persons, 
organisations, etc.) discussed by radical groups. They may also cover only the terminology 
of a particular subgroup, or even only one language (e.g., Arabic). Collected content and 
accounts are therefore biased to the original lexicons used for collection. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge that the obtained findings (or developed radicalisation detection 
classifiers) may not be general but restricted to particular topics of discussion.  
● Time-period: Data collections are generally restricted to particular time periods (generally 
a few months). Data is therefore biased to the world events happening during those 
particular months (i.e., particular terror attacks, regions of the world, political and religious 
figures, etc.). Classifiers may therefore learn that naming certain political or religious 
figures, or locations, are reliable indicators to determine whether a piece of content, or a 
user account, is radical. However, as time evolves, those locations, those popular figures, 
those events, may not be relevant or even discussed any longer. In certain cases, they may 
  
even become discriminative of the opposite class (e.g., locations under control by a radical 
group that become liberated) Hence, classifiers trained on data collected in the past to 
detect and predict radicalisation in the present, or the future, may not perform with the 
expected level of correctness.   
● Graph-sampling: The discovery of related accounts is generally based on graph sampling 
methods, where related accounts are discovered from the social graph of known radical 
(i.e., seed) accounts. The expanded dataset therefore depends on the choice of the initial 
seed accounts. The other key problem is the type or relations selected to do graph sampling, 
since in the case of ‘followers’, irrelevant or noisy accounts, such as reporters and 
researchers, who are just ‘listening’ to jihadist accounts, are likely to be included (Parekh 
et al., 2018; Klausen, 2015). 
● Geographical: Some data collections are restricted to particular regions of the world (e.g., 
western countries (Rowe and Saif, 2016)). Variations in user generated content, 
particularly text, are well-documented across and within demographic groups. Findings 
about ‘radicalisation’ based on such samples may hence not be generalisable to other 
regions in the world.   
Incompleteness 
When datasets are collected based on keywords, or when data is gathered based on comments on 
particular YouTube channels, or social media groups, the collected datasets contain very few posts 
(if more than one) associated to a particular user account (incomplete user profiles). This means 
that, for most user accounts, only a partial view of the history (or timeline) of such account is 
available. This limits the type of research that can be conducted, since it is very difficult (if not 
impossible) to study the behavioural evolution of users towards more radical views if their historic 
posts are not available. Since social media platforms sometimes close radical accounts fairly 
quickly, recollecting data from such accounts is no longer possible. Similarly, although accounts 
that get blocked tend to resurface under different names (Conway et al., 2017), those accounts do 
not have historical data, and therefore AI solutions need to deal with a ‘cold start’ problem (i.e., 
accurate inferences cannot be drawn from accounts for which we have not yet gathered sufficient 
information).  
An additional element of incompleteness within existing datasets are the collected social graphs. 
In most occasions only a partial sample of the social graph of the collected accounts is being 
gathered (incomplete social graphs). Some researchers tried to reproduce social graphs based on 
implicit connections (e.g., users mentioning other users within the content (Fernandez et al., 
2019)), when the explicit (friend / follower) relations among accounts are not available.  
Heterogeneity (Variety of content) 
Another relevant consideration is the heterogeneity of the data. Online data comes in multiple 
languages, from multiple platforms, in multiple formats (audio, video, text) and from multiple 
  
radical groups and subgroups. The development of ‘generic’ online radicalisation detection 
methods in an ever changing and heterogeneous world is a complex and challenging task.  
● Language: Online data comes in multiple languages, sometimes underrepresented 
languages or forms of text, such as Arabizi (Arabic language written in Latin Script 
(Tobaili et al., 2019)). Multiple challenges arise when dealing with the multilingual sea of 
data available online: (i) the lack of resources and local expertise to analyse 
underrepresented languages, (ii) the automatic identification of the written language, since 
not only languages coexist across different pieces of content, but the same piece of content 
may contain terms and expressions in more than one language, and (iii) the informality of 
social media language, which is an added challenge to the multilinguality of the text. Note 
that terms and expressions in social media are sometimes written without following 
standard morphological, or syntactic rules (e.g., ‘Heeeeeello’ vs. Hello). It is also the case 
that communities and social groups often invent and adopt terms to define new realities. 
For example, the acronym KTHHFV, adopted within extreme misogynist communities 
(Farrell et al., 2019) refers to a Kissless, touchless, hugless, handholdless, friendless, virgin 
person.7 Not only those new terms and expressions are not available within standard 
dictionaries, but also the meanings of those terms and expressions are not known outside 
the communities that invented and adopted them, hence expert or inside knowledge is 
needed to capture these complex semantics. 
● Platforms: radical content is shared in multiple social networking platforms, including 
Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, Watsapp, Telegram, etc. Each platform differs on how content 
is posted (e.g,  Twitter limits the amount of characters of a posts while other platforms 
don’t have length restrictions) or how user relations are established (e.g., Twitter 
distinguishes between ‘followers - people who follow a user account’ and ‘followees - 
people to whom the user account follows’) whether others, like Watsapp, do not consider 
bidirectional relationships. There are also distinctions on how content is shared, how 
accounts are referred to, or named, whether videos can be streamed, etc. 
● Radical groups: Not only different accounts may express different extremist ideologies 
(Jihadist, Far-right, extreme misogyny, etc.), but also within the same extremist ideology 
we may find different groups. These groups, while having some common ground, differ in 
their interpretation of concepts, and in their attitudes and actions. Not only these groups 
coexist within the online world, they also merge and shift depending on real-world events, 
interests and conflicts.8  
● Content types: In the online world different types of content emerge including videos, 
images, text, etc. The automatic processing of multimedia content is very different than the 
processing of textual content. Combinations of AI techniques are therefore needed to 
understand the complete picture of the radical material being disseminated. 
 
7 https://www.reddit.com/r/IncelTears/comments/aoekwm/incel_language_dictionary/ 
8 https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c200ntjp 
  
Irreproducibility 
A key problem of existing radicalisation research is the lack of reproducibility, since datasets used 
to study radicalisation are not shared, and once user accounts or content are blocked, data can no 
longer be recollected.  
● Datasets are not publicly available: As mentioned when describing existing data 
publishing methods, while multiple datasets have been collected for research, due to the 
sensitivity of the data, and to comply with existing social networking sites regulations 
(Twitter data policies, 2019), and data regulations, such as GDPR (GDPR, 2019), 
researchers are not sharing the collected datasets. This implies that: (i) further assessments 
over the data are very difficult to perform, (ii) researchers struggle to build on previous 
studies and developed systems to further advance research.  
● Once accounts/websites are closed data cannot be recollected: Researchers working in 
online radicalisation sometimes share the IDs of forums/groups, accounts or posts (Farrell 
et al., 2019), so that other researchers can recollect the data. The problem in this case is 
that, if the collected accounts were indeed radical, or the collected content exhibited radical 
terminology or material, they will be blocked at the time of recollection. Moreover, 
according to the data regulations of some social media platforms, like Twitter (Twitter data 
policies, 2019), researchers and practitioners that collect data are responsible of making all 
reasonable efforts to delete the collected content, if such content is deleted, gains protected 
status or is suspended (unless otherwise prohibited by applicable law or regulation, and 
with the express written permission of Twitter). This regulation makes it even more 
difficult to maintain datasets to study radicalisation.  
● Encrypted and private communications cannot be accessed: Extremist organisations 
sometimes move from the public sphere to a more private medium. This is for example the 
case of the Islamic State (IS), which moved many of its communications to Telegram due 
to the disruption they suffered on more visible platforms such as Twitter (Conway et al., 
2017). Platforms such as Telegram or Whatsapp offer end-to-end encrypted 
communications. Therefore, messages sent via private channels, groups and chats cannot 
be collected. Journalist and researchers have nonetheless gathered and studied information 
from these platforms via public Telegram channels, and by infiltrating private groups 
(Clifford and Powell, 2019). IS has also started to experiment with the Decentralised Web. 
Platforms such as RocketChat and ZeroNet proved attractive for IS media operatives since 
the developers of those platforms are unable to act against content that is stored on user-
operated servers or dispersed across the user community (King, 2019). 
Research Methodologies 
Various problems and challenges are also derived from the research methodologies used to 
investigate online radicalisation. We will discuss in this section two common issues: (i) the lack 
  
of a control group to contrast research findings, and (ii) the lack of comparison across existing 
technological solutions.  
Lack of comparison against a control group 
One of the key problems with existing radicalisation research is the lack of comparison against 
a control group. Most data analysis approaches are based on the study of datasets containing 
radical content, or radical accounts (Bermingham et al., 2009; Chatfield et al., 2015; Rowe and 
Saif, 2016; Badawy and Ferrara, 2018). Based on the analysis of these datasets, these works make 
conclusions on the most discriminative features or characteristics of radical content and users. 
However, they do not investigate how these features differ from those of a control group (e.g., 
religious not violent accounts, accounts from journalist reporting about related events, counter-
extremist accounts, and accounts from users with no particular relation with radicalisation). Unless 
such comparisons are made, it is not possible to claim that certain terms, behaviours, networks, 
etc., are specific of extremist content or accounts.   
In the case of the creation of detection and prediction approaches, most works use a control group, 
so that the AI algorithms can learn the key discriminative features and divergences between the 
radical and the non-radical control group. The key problem with some of these works is that, in 
the majority of the cases, the used control group is composed by randomly collected posts and 
user accounts (Agarwal and Sureka 2015b; Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017). These are the accounts of 
average social platform users (who may talk about their work, their pets, or other topics not even 
partially related with extremism or radicalisation). The key challenge however, lies on 
differentiating radical accounts from those that, despite using the same terminology, reporting the 
same events, or talking about the same topics, are indeed not radical (e.g., accounts or religious 
not violent individuals, journalist accounts, counter-terrorism accounts, etc.). While some works 
have attempted to generate control-group datasets by considering similar lexicons to collect radical 
and non-radical accounts (Fernandez and Alani, 2018), those accounts are not-verified, and it is 
therefore not possible to determine whether the control group contains representative examples of 
the above mentioned categories, or simply standard Twitter users that at some point in time, share 
the same terminology than the radical group under study.  Another issue emerges when the control 
group is collected in a different time period (Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017). Classifiers may then select 
as discriminative features of the non-radical class terms, like political figures, simply because these 
terms did not exist in the previous time period when the radical group was collected.  
Lack of comparison across approaches 
The other main issue that we observe within the literature is the lack of comparison across existing 
approaches. Different works have analysed and are trained over different datasets, making results 
and approaches not easily comparable.  
  
In (Correa and Sureka, 2013; Agarwal and Sureka 2015a), the authors conducted an extensive 
survey of the techniques used to identify and predict radicalisation in social media. From these 
systematic literature reviews, and the overview provided in this paper, we can observe the use of 
multiple techniques within different subfields of AI including:  
● Natural Language Processing (NLP) and the use and development of lexicons to interpret 
text (Vergani and Bliuc, 2015; Fernandez et al., 2018; Badawy and Ferrara, 2018),  
● Machine Learning (ML) mostly supervised approaches (SVM, Linear Regressions, Naive 
Bayes, Decision Trees, and lately deep-learning models) for the automatic detection and 
prediction of radicalisation (Berger and Morgan, 2015; Agarwal and Sureka 2015b),  
● Semantic Web technologies (entity and relation extraction and analysis) (Saif et al., 2017; 
Fernandez and Alani, 2018) to better identify the semantic context in which words and 
expressions are used, or the context in which certain entities (persons, organisations, 
locations) are mentioned, as a way to improve the accuracy of existing algorithms for 
radicalisation detection.  
● Information Retrieval techniques (IR), particularly the use of ranking methods and 
recommender systems (Fernandez et al., 2018; Fernandez et al., 2019), as a way to filter 
and rank content and accounts rather than providing a binary categorisation (radical vs. 
non-radical)  
However, while literature surveys have attempted to identify the wide range of AI techniques used 
to counter online radicalisation, to the best of our knowledge, there are no replication studies in 
the literature attempting to compare existing approaches and techniques. Comparative 
studies could help to determine which features, or which classification methods do actually 
perform more reliably, accurately and efficiently, and under which contexts, when countering 
online radicalisation. It’s also important to note that the algorithms designed and developed by 
Tech companies (such as Twitter, Google, or Facebook) are not public, and therefore not available 
for comparison.  
Lack of cooperation across research fields 
Understanding the mechanisms that govern the process of radicalisation, and online radicalisation 
in particular, has been the topic of investigation in multiple research fields including: social 
sciences (Schmid, 2013; Hafez and Mullins, 2015), psychology (Moghaddam, 2005; Van der Veen, 
2016), computing (Agarwal and Sureka 2015a), policing (Silber et al., 2007), and governance 
(European Parliament, 2019). These efforts however, have mostly evolved in silos, and most of 
the existing works towards the design and development of AI technology to counter online 
radicalisation are neither based on, nor do they take advantage of, the existing theories and studies 
of radicalisation coming from social sciences, psychology or policing.  
Models from social science, psychology and policing have investigated  the factors that drive 
people to get radicalised (Moghaddam, 2005) (e.g., failed integration, poverty, discrimination), 
  
their different roots (Schmid, 2013; Borum, 2016) (micro-level, or individual level, mesolevel, or 
group/community level, and macro-level, or global level, the influence of government and society 
at home and abroad), and how the radicalisation process happens and evolves, i.e., what are its 
different stages (Silber et al., 2007) (e.g., pre-radicalisation, self-identification, indoctrination, 
Jihadisation) . However, very few works in the literature (Lara-Cabrera et al., 2017; Fernandez et 
al., 2018) have use the learning from these models to create more effective radicalisation analysis 
and detection methods. AI technology development needs to leverage closer the knowledge of 
theoretical models of radicalisation to design more effective technological solutions to target 
online radicalisation. 
Adaptation of extremist groups 
While multiple efforts are being made to design and develop effective AI solutions that 
automatically identify and block radical accounts, or that stop the viral spreading or radical content, 
extremist groups are adapting their behaviour to avoid being detected, or to resurface once they 
have been blocked (Conway et al., 2017). We list here some of the adaptation techniques used by 
these groups to maintain their online presence (Bodo, 2018). 
● Content adaptation: In order to avoid being flagged by AI technology, extremist 
organisations adapt their content, either by replacing/modifying terms, or by distorting the 
audio and pixilation of images and videos (Stalman, 2019). 
● User-account adaptation: Some extremist groups use proxies, such as media 
organizations or local charities, to post content on the platforms for them to avoid being 
detected (Frenkel and Hubbard, 2019). In the cases where the accounts are blocked, 
extremist groups manage to keep reemerging within the same platform under different 
names, using a variety of strategies to be found by their followers (Conway et al., 2017). 
● Platform adaptation:  In some cases, extremist groups also change platforms. An example 
is the Islamic State (IS), which in recent years moved many of its communication to 
Telegram (al-Lami, 2018; Clifford and Powell, 2019)  due to the disruption they faced on 
more visible platforms such as Twitter (Conway et al., 2017), and more recently they are 
exploring the use of the decentralised Web via platforms like RocketChat and ZeroNet 
(King, 2019). 
● Technology adaptation: Extremist organisations make use of the latest technological 
developments in order to increase the spread of their message. A key example of this is the 
use of life-stream videos. For example, during the recent attack at Christchurch, New 
Zealand, the video of the shooting was spread all around the internet. Despite the efforts of 
tech companies to contain the virality, many hours after the shooting, various clips of the 
video were still searchable (Lapowsky, 2019).  
  
Ethics and Conflicts in Legislation 
Another key challenge of the design, development and use of AI to counter radicalisation is that 
technology needs to comply with legislation that can sometimes be ambiguous or 
contradictory, particularly when it comes to the tension between security, privacy and freedom 
of expression. The European Commission, for example, is proposing legislation to ensure all 
member states bring in sanctions against those who repeatedly fail to respond to removal orders of 
radical content, facing penalties up to 4% of their global revenue. The draft regulation was 
approved by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in April 2019 (European Parliament, 
2019). Critics, including internet freedom think tanks and big tech firms, claim the legislation 
threatens the principles of a free and open internet (Porter, 2019).9 Another example is the 
regulation that will force WhatsApp, Facebook and other social media platforms to disclose 
encrypted messages from suspected terrorists under a new treaty between the UK and US 
(Swinford, 2019), with a similar law is already approved in Australia.10 Privacy advocates are 
highly critical and have highlighted the potential negative implications that these regulations will 
have for future cases on privacy and government surveillance.  
The other key issue that emerges from the use of AI to counter online radicalisation is the need for 
a constant review of ethical guidelines in order to assess the risk of the proposed technology and 
address them through reflexivity and anticipation (Troullinou and d'Aquin, 2018). Processes and 
decisions, once undertaken by humans, are now computer-driven, increasingly derived through AI 
powered by big data. And, while reports from the European Union (EU) (European Commission, 
2018) state the need of AI to be based on values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights11; the reality is that the rapid and ethically 
careless development of AI has led to serious adverse effects that go against these values (Harford, 
2014).  In the case of the development of AI systems to counter online extremism, the wrong 
categorisation of a user as ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ may result in an innocent person being subjected 
to surveillance. It is therefore extremely important to consider potential sources of inaccuracy of 
automatic AI-powered radicalisation detection approaches, and to have a constant reflection and 
continuous change in ethical guidelines to reduce the potential negative impact of AI 
developments.   
Opportunities 
The challenges and issues reported above open a wide range of opportunities for the improvement 
of AI solutions to counter online radicalisation. We highlight here six main lines of research that 
we hope to inspire the design and development of future AI technology: (i) stronger collaboration 
 
9 https://cdt.org/files/2019/02/Civil-Society-Letter-to-European-Parliament-on-Terrorism-Database.pdf 
10 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-australia-46463029 
11 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXTandfrom=EN 
  
across research disciplines and organisations, (ii) creation of reliable datasets to study online 
radicalisation, (iii) development of comparative studies, (iv) contextual adaptation of technological 
solutions (v) better integration of humans and technology and, (vi) ethical vigilance.  
Collaboration across research disciplines and organisations 
Since 2017 several initiatives, such as the Global Internet Forum,12 or Tech Against Terrorism13 
have emerged, putting Tech Companies in contact with Governments, Civil Societies, researchers 
and NGOS in order to have a better understanding of what radicalisation is, and how to stop the 
online phenomenon. These initiatives are helping to create consensus, and to define more clearly 
what constitutes radical and extremist internet activity, since tech companies should not be the 
‘deciders’ of content moderation (Saltman, 2019). It is also necessary to include different points 
of view on the discussion table, to ensure the right balance between security, privacy, freedom of 
expression and content moderation.  
While initiatives have emerged to ensure a wide range of organisations are collaborating towards 
the development of AI solutions to counter radicalisation, synergies across different research fields 
(psychology, social science, policing, computer science) are yet to become a reality (Scrivens and 
Davies, 2018). AI design and development can strongly benefit from leveraging closer the 
knowledge of theoretical models of radicalisation, and the empirical evidence gathered through 
policing research, to design more effective technological solutions to target online radicalisation. 
Creation of reliable datasets to study radicalisation 
As we observed in the previous section, the majority of ground truth datasets used to study online 
radicalisation lack of solid verification. We continue to observe false positives, incompleteness 
and biases in those datasets. Many datasets used in radicalization studies are no longer available 
and recollecting that data is no longer possible. Obtaining and annotating data to create reliable 
gold standard datasets (as well as sharing them for reproducibility purposes) are key future steps 
for research on online radicalisation.  
Comparative Studies 
As previously reported, different AI approaches have been developed to counter online 
radicalisation. However, while some of these approaches target the same objective (e.g., identify 
radical content / identify radical accounts), they have not been compared against one another. 
Replication studies are therefore needed to assess existing approaches and techniques, to 
 
12 https://www.gifct.org/leadership/ 
13 https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/ 
  
understand their strengths and limitations and to determine which ones should be applied and under 
which conditions.  
Contextual Adaptation of Technological Solutions 
As mentioned in our first reported challenge radicalisation needs to be understood in context (time, 
geographic location, culture, etc.). The same piece of content may be deemed as radical within a 
particular region of the world, and as non radical in a different region. Similarly, as shown by 
(Fernandez and Alani, 2018), contextual divergences also emerge within the use of radicalisation 
terms, and understanding such nuances can help to enhance existing radicalisation detection 
approaches. It is therefore important to develop robust technological solutions, able to adapt to the 
different contexts in which they may need to operate.  
Better integration of humans and technology 
Radicalisation is a human-driven problem, and to develop effective AI solutions to counter this 
problem it is important to introduce humans in the loop. Human feedback and expertise can be 
applied at various levels including:  
● Co-creation with users: technology development could benefit from the use of co-creation 
to ensure that different points of view and perspectives are gathered and that this complex 
problem is targeted simultaneously from different angles.  
● Technology and humans deciding together: Expertise may be needed to review complex 
software decisions. Developing technology that facilitates that human expertise is 
integrated in the decision-making process could help mitigating the impact of erroneous or 
controversial outputs. 
● Human feedback for technology adaptation: The development of technology that gathers 
and integrates human feedback can help ensuring that algorithms are retrained, capturing 
evolving behaviours, themes, and novel radicalisation strategies.   
Ethical Vigilance 
As we previously discussed, there is a strong tension between ensuring security, privacy, and 
freedom of expression, when targeting online radicalisation. Ethical methodologies are therefore 
needed to track the human and societal effects of AI technologies during the design, development, 
and post-production processes. Particularly, the development of postmarket ethical monitoring 
methods will be needed to further refine, confirm or deny, the safety of a particular technology 
after it is used to counter online extremism, helping to identify potential unforeseen negative 
effects. 
  
Conclusions 
In this book chapter we have provided an overview of the current AI technological advancements 
towards addressing the problem of online extremism, identified some of the limitations of existing 
solutions, and highlighted some opportunities for future research. We hope the provided critical 
reflections will stimulate discussions on the future design and development of AI technology to 
target the problem of online extremism. 
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